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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-2799
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CLAUDELLE MCMAHILL,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:06-cr-00216-005)
District Judge: Hon. Joy Flowers Conti
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 26, 2011
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 29, 2011)
_____________
OPINION
_____________
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Claudele McMahill1 appeals her conviction and sentence for mail fraud and
conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 371. For the
reasons set forth below, we will affirm.2
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we assume familiarity with the case
and discuss only those facts necessary to our decision. In 2003, Claudele McMahill and
Lacy Tilley were romantically involved. At that time, Tilley was vice president of Penn
Window Cleaning, a company owned by Steve Gaber. In January 2004, McMahill began
working at Acme Building Service, a janitorial services company which Gaber also
owned. McMahill was hired to work on increasing the company‟s sales as well as to
prepare the company for its eventual sale to Tilley. In April 2004, Tilley purchased
Acme‟s assets, and with Acme‟s former clients and personnel, continued Acme‟s
business operation under a new company name – United Building Maintenance
(“UBM”).
Following the purchase, Tilley informed his employees that UBM could not afford
to continue to pay them the salaries they made with Acme. Tilley told them that if they
wanted to continue working for UBM, they would have to file for unemployment
compensation, and that UBM would then pay them “under the table” to cover the
1

Although the case caption as docketed indicates that McMahill‟s first name is
“Claudelle,” McMahill spells her name “Claudele.”
2

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2

difference between the unemployment benefits they received and what they had earned
working for Acme. McMahill, along with several other former Acme employees,
participated in the scheme and, while working for UBM, fraudulently claimed and
received unemployment benefits.
McMahill and Tilley were ultimately jointly indicted and tried in the Western
District of Pennsylvania on several counts of mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 371. The jury found McMahill and Tilley
guilty on all charged counts. McMahill was sentenced to a prison term of 20 months.
McMahill raises two challenges on appeal. First, she claims that the District Court
abused its discretion in denying her motion to sever. Second, she argues that the District
Court erred in enhancing her offense level for obstruction of justice pursuant to United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3C1.1. We find both claims to be without
merit.
II.
A. Motion for Severance
At trial, McMahill and Tilley were separately represented by counsel, until Tilley,
after the close of the government‟s case, decided he wanted to proceed pro se.
McMahill‟s counsel subsequently moved to sever his client‟s case from Tilley‟s pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, arguing that Tilley‟s self-representation was
unfairly prejudicing McMahill. The District Court disagreed that severance was
warranted and denied the motion. McMahill argues that the District Court erred in
denying the motion for severance.
3

Rule 14(a) permits a court to sever defendants‟ trials where consolidation “appears
to prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). We have recognized that severance
should be granted “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable
judgment about guilt or innocence.” United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir.
2005) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)). A defendant seeking
to sever “bear[s] a heavy burden and must demonstrate not only abuse of discretion in
denying severance, but also that the denial of severance would lead to clear and
substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.” Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
McMahill asserts that Tilley‟s “testimony and closing argument could not have
been more disastrous for [her].” (McMahill‟s Br. at 14.) McMahill appears to argue that
she was tainted by Tilley‟s general demeanor at trial. She accuses Tilley of being an
evasive and paranoid witness, and also cites his expression of contempt for the federal
government and his remarks that a number of individuals, including McMahill‟s exhusband, Gaber, and the prosecutor, were trying to cause trouble for Tilley.
To the extent such allegedly prejudicial conduct or statements occurred during
Tilley‟s testimony, it is not at all clear that they bear any relation to the decision to
proceed pro se, which was the purported basis of McMahill‟s motion for severance.
Moreover, we think that any taint that may have arisen as a result of the jury‟s perception
of Tilley‟s demeanor or character would have prejudiced only Tilley himself, and could
not reasonably have affected the jury‟s view of McMahill or her guilt, especially in light
4

of the District Court‟s specific instruction to the jury that “the personalities and the
conduct of counsel, and here I might add, Mr. Tilley, when he was acting as his own
counsel, are not in any way an issue.” (A. 2157.)
McMahill further asserts that she was prejudiced by Tilley‟s specific testimony
concerning her. She states that Tilley was “evasive [on cross-examination] as to
[McMahill‟s] role at UBM, denying that she was an employee while simultaneously
claiming that she worked there.” (McMahill‟s Br. at 7.) Tilley‟s testimony was not
evasive – it was simply his and McMahill‟s version of events, i.e., McMahill worked for
UBM, but was not receiving remuneration for any of her services. And, if his articulation
of McMahill‟s own defense was evasive, the record makes clear that it was not any more
evasive than her own testimony on the issue.
McMahill also asserts that she was prejudiced by Tilley‟s testimony that following
his decision to purchase Acme, he sent McMahill there to act “sort of as a spy” for him.
(A. 1323.) McMahill does not explain why she believes Tilley‟s reference to her as his
“spy” at Acme would be so damaging, and we are unable to agree that it would have
caused her any prejudice. McMahill further complains that Tilley‟s testimony “identified
her as a corporate officer” and that he introduced a UBM organizational chart that
referenced McMahill. We cannot agree that this testimony prejudiced McMahill in view
of the other substantial evidence, including McMahill‟s own testimony, that McMahill
worked for UBM while she claimed and collected unemployment benefits. Furthermore,
the specific allegation of prejudice here is completely undercut by the fact that McMahill
herself testified that she held herself out to be vice president of UBM. While Tilley‟s
5

“identification” of McMahill as a corporate officer may have been unfavorable to
McMahill‟s defense that she was not working for UBM, it was certainly not more
unfavorable than McMahill‟s own admission that she held herself out to be UBM‟s vice
president.
McMahill also claims that she was prejudiced when Tilley “opened the door” to
evidence concerning his involvement in an unrelated embezzlement scheme for which
Tilley was also under indictment. The prosecutor‟s questioning, however, did not
implicate McMahill in the alleged embezzlement scheme and the District Court
specifically instructed the jury that, to the extent Tilley denied engaging in any
embezzlement, there was no evidence in the trial that Tilley committed embezzlement.
Even if we assume that the jury impermissibly construed the government‟s line of
questioning as evidence that Tilley committed embezzlement, the District Court
instructed the jury to compartmentalize the evidence as to each defendant, and there is no
reason to think that the jury would not have been able to follow that instruction.
In sum, McMahill has not met her burden to show that the denial of severance
caused “clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.” Urban, 404
F.3d at 775 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we must reject her claim
for relief.
B. Obstruction of Justice Sentence Enhancement
In its pre-sentence investigation report, the Probation Office calculated
McMahill‟s total offense level to be 13, which, with her criminal history category of I,
resulted in an advisory guideline range of 12 to 18 months‟ imprisonment. The
6

government objected to the Probation Office‟s offense-level calculation on the ground
that the office had not applied an “obstruction of justice” enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The District Court ruled that a two-level obstruction of justice
enhancement was appropriate, finding that McMahill perjured herself in testifying that
the checks she received from UBM during the time the government contended that she
worked for the company while fraudulently receiving unemployment compensation
constituted either the repayment of money she had loaned to Tilley or expense
reimbursements. The two-level enhancement resulted in an increased guideline range of
18 to 24 months. The District Court sentenced McMahill to 20 months‟ imprisonment
and 3 years‟ post-release supervision.
We have explained that “to trigger application of § 3C1.1 on perjury grounds, a
defendant must give „false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent
to provide false testimony.‟” United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 75 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)). The District Court
concluded that McMahill‟s testimony was false in light of the absence of credible
evidence substantiating the existence of any loan from her to Tilley, as well as the
extensive evidence demonstrating that McMahill was in fact working for UBM during the
period she collected unemployment insurance. The District Court further found the
testimony to be material, in that the testimony, if credited, bolstered McMahill‟s defense
that she was not being paid for her services at UBM. Lastly, the District Court found that
McMahill gave the testimony with the willful intent to provide false testimony, noting
that it was not the type of testimony that could be given as a result of confusion or
7

mistake. See Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94-95 (distinguishing perjured testimony from false
testimony given as a result of “confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.”)
McMahill argues that the District Court erred in applying the two-level obstruction
of justice enhancement because “[t]here was no evidence introduced that [the] cash loan
never occurred.” (McMahill‟s Br. at 16.) We review a district court‟s determination that
a defendant committed perjury for clear error. See United States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d
305, 315 (3d Cir. 1991). We will not reverse the court‟s determination unless we are
“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
It is well-established that the facts underlying a sentencing enhancement,
including an enhancement for the obstruction of justice, must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir.
2002); United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 965 (3d Cir. 1992). In this case, there
was ample evidence that McMahill was a compensated employee of UBM while
receiving unemployment compensation benefits. The absence of evidence that she had
not loaned cash to Tilley did not preclude the District Court from disbelieving McMahill.
Accordingly, the District Court did not clearly err in finding that McMahill committed
perjury when she testified that the payments she received from the company were either
loan repayments or expense reimbursements.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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